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Belief in God and Transcendental
Meditation: The Problem of Defining
Religion in the First Amendment
I. Introduction
What is the meaning of the word "religion" in the first
amendment?' In particular, how far does the constitutional defi-
nition of religion extend beyond theism?2 Whatever that defini-
tion may be, should it be the same for both the free exercise and
establishment clauses? Recently, the Federal District Court for
New Jersey8 and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit4
struggled with these questions in Malnak v. Yogi,5 which in-
volved the teaching of the Science of Creative Intelligence -
Transcendental Meditation (SCI/TM) in New Jersey public high
schools. Even though SCI/TM involves no belief in a Supreme
Being, both courts found it to be a religion for first amendment
purposes, and held that an establishment of religion had
occurred.
This note suggests a possible definition of religion by focus-
ing on Judge Adams's concurring opinion to the court of appeals
per curiam affirmance in Mainak.' Judge Adams's opinion sets
forth guidelines which offer a coherent approach to defining re-
ligion that is in harmony with society's changing experience of
religion and with the underlying purposes and values of the first
amendment. These guidelines not only help to clarify recent Su-
preme Court attempts to define religion, but also suggest that,
despite arguments to the contary, a unitary definition of religion
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . ." Id.
2. Theism is the "belief in the existence of one God who is viewed as the creative
source of man, the world, and value and who transcends and yet is imminent in the
world." WEWSTR's THIRD NEw INT'L DICTIONARY 203 (unabridged ed. 1971).
3. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197
(3d Cir. 1979).
4. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
5. Id.
6. Id.
1
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for the two religion clauses is both possible and necessary.
Before analyzing Judge Adams's opinion, this note first re-
views previous cases and past attempts by the courts to define
religion in a manner that accounts for the growth of non-theistic
beliefs. Second, it looks at how the district court's opinion and
the court of appeals' per curiam opinion in Malnak fail to move
beyond the vague standards established by the previous cases.
Finally, in the context of this review of the previous cases and
the other opinions of Malnak, it analyzes Judge Adams's concur-
ring opinion and argues for a unitary definition of religion.
II. Belief in God and the Struggle to Define Religion
Traditionally, religion in the United States was thought to
involve some form of belief in a Supreme Being. James Madison
expressed this view in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments7 when he defined religion as "the
duty we owe our Creator and the Manner of discharging it."'
Numerous United States Supreme Court cases9 have echoed the
same sentiment. In 1890, in Davis v. Beason,10 the Supreme
Court stated that "'religion' has reference to one's views of his
relationship to his Creator, and the obligations they impose of
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his
will." As recently as 1952, the Court said, "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."'
2
In more recent years, however, there has been a move away
from this uniform viewpoint. Certain theologians and philoso-
phers of some of the established theistic religions have become
dissatisfied with traditional concepts of God, and are now mov-
7. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
COMPLETE MADISON, His BASIC WRITINGS 299 (S. Padover ed. 1973). The text of the Me-
morial is also reproduced in the Appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (appendix to Justice Rutledge's
dissenting opinion).
8. Id. at 299.
9. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach v. Caluson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
10. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
11. Id. at 342.
12. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); also quoted in McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ing towards new, non-theistic concepts." Interest has also grown
in several of the traditional Eastern religions"' which contain be-
liefs that may appear unorthodox to Westerners. Due to these
developments, the traditional conception of God as a Supreme
Being and Creator of the universe has been challenged,'1 and
with this challenge has come a disturbance in the traditional le-
gal view of what constitutes a religion.' 6
This changing perception and experience of religion has
been acknowledged in several recent court decisions. In 1943, in
United States v. Kauten,17 Judge Augustus Hand formulated a
new definition of religion while interpreting the conscientious
objector exemption of the Selective Service Act of 1940. Hand
stated:
[rieligious belief arises from a sense of inadequacy of reason as a
means of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his uni-
verse .... Conscientious objection.. . may justly be regarded as
a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it con-
science or God, that is for many persons at the present time the
equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse."8
This definition hinges not on the content of the belief, but on
the central function it serves in the life of the individual of
forming a bridge between his innermost being - be it his con-
science or his God - and the rest of the world. Belief in a Su-
preme Being, according to this definition, is not necessary to
make a belief religious; it is only necessary that the belief serve
the appropriate central function in the individual's life.
Eighteen years after Kauten, in Torcaso v. Watkins," the
Supreme Court defined religion in the first amendment to en-
13. See Comment, Towards A Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1056, 1068-69 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
14. Id. at 1069 n.80; Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 207 (Adams, J., concurring).
15. See Comment, supra note 13, at 1068-72.
16. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (Adams, J., concurring); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
17. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
18. Id. at 708. One commentator has summarized this definition as follows:
"[R]eligion is a belief in a final reality, based not entirely on reason, relating the individ-
ual to his fellow man and the universe, and finding expression in veneration and in an
inward mentor called conscience." Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institu-
tional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. Rv. 479, 485 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Boyan].
19. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
1982]
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compass religious concepts that do not include a belief in God.20
Torcaso involved a provision of the Maryland Constitution that
required certain state officials to declare a belief in God as a pre-
requisite for taking office. The Court struck down the provision
on both free exercise and establishment grounds, stating that
the state and federal governments cannot "aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those reli-
gions founded on different beliefs."" In an often cited footnote,
the Court added that "[a]mong religions in this country which
do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secu-
lar Humanism and others.12 Thus, the Court recognized that
non-theistic beliefs can be characterized as religious for purposes
of the first amendment. Although the Court in Torcaso had be-
gun to move away from a content based definition of religion,
and particularly away from a theistic definition, it did not give
any guidelines to determine which non-theistic concepts might
fall within the bounds of the first amendment's religion clauses.
In Welsh v. United States'5 and United States v. Seeger,"
the Supreme Court was forced to consider the problem again in
the context of defining what constituted "religious training and
belief" for section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act.2' Both cases involved conscientious objectors who
sought exemption from military service, but who refused to af-
20. Id. at 495 n.11.
21. Id. at 495.
22. Id. at 495 n.11.
23. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
24. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
25. Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), ch. 144, 65 Stat. 75 (1951)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1976)). The Act read in part as follows:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be sub-
ject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war of any form. Religious training and belief in this connection
means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relationship, but does not include essen-
tially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.
Id. § 6(j). The Supreme Court in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336 n. 2 (1970),
pointed out that the reference to a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being" was deleted
following the decision in Seeger.
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firm a belief in a Supreme Being, as required by the Act. Al-
though neither decision was constitutionally based, it has been
argued that the Court's approach as seen in Seeger and Welsh is
indicative of the approach the Court would take in formulating a
constitutional definition of religion. 6
The Supreme Court in Seeger acknowledged "the ever-
broadening understanding of the modern religious community"
as to the concept of God,27 and cited Protestant theologian Paul
Tillich's concept that the source of meaning and certitude in life
"'is not the God of traditional theism but the 'God above God',
the power of being, which works through those who have no
name for it, not even the name of God.' "28 Tillich described God
as the "ground of our being" and spoke of how "the God of both
religious and theological language disappears."' 9 In light of these
and other progressive views of the nature of belief in God,30 the
Court defined religious belief broadly to include a sincere belief
"based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else
is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent."3 1
To be religious, a belief need only involve an individual's "ulti-
mate concern."'
The Seeger Court implicitly deleted from section 6(j) the
requirement that a registrant's objection to war be based on a
belief in a Supreme Being, reading the statute only to require a
belief that "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by. .. God" in traditionally religious persons. The
Court in Welsh developed this concept futher, stating: "The
central consideration in determining whether the registrant's be-
26. Comment, supra note 13, at 1064. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 356
(Harlan, J., concurring). In discussing this point, the district court in Malnak v. Yogi,
440 F. Supp. at 1314, pointed out that in the realm of statutory construction, the Su-
preme Court "is far more circumscribed in defining terms than it is in the area of consti-
tutional interpretation." The court of appeals in Malnak made the same point. Malnak
v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 204-05 (Adams, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 180.
28. Id. (quoting P. TnLICH, II SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957)).
29. Id.
30. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 181-83.
31. Id. at 176.
32. P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-2 (1958).
33. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. The Court enthusiastically applied this
test in Welsh, and even extended it to include beliefs of only moral or ethical nature.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
1982]
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liefs are religious is whether these beliefs play the role of a relig-
ion and function as a religion in the registrant's life."34 This ap-
proach to testing whether a belief is religious is reminiscent of
Judge Hand's approach in United States v. Kauten.35 Both ap-
proaches stress the function and importance of the belief in the
adherent's life; but whereas the Supreme Court's approach relies
more heavily on a comparison to traditional theistic beliefs,
Judge Hand's approach begins to consider the manner in which
the belief actually operates in relating the individual to the
larger universe and orienting him within it.
Both approaches suffer from the same problem, however:
they are vague and rely heavily on uncertain analogies to tradi-
tional religions. One commentator has written that the Supreme
Court's approach "is little more than a point of departure and
gives minimum guidance to courts in determining what beliefs
are fundamental enough to be taken seriously as matters of ulti-
mate concern. 316 Although the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the deficiency of a purely theistic definition of religion
and religious belief,37 it has not supplied a clear, new definition
to replace the old. Rather than embark on that unsure voyage,
the Court apparently has been content to leave the lower courts
to draw open-ended analogies to the older and more familiar re-
ligious traditions.
III. Malnak v. Yogi
A. The Facts
Malnak v. Yogi 8 involved an elective course on the Science
of Creative Intelligence - Transcendental Meditation (SCI/TM)
offered in five New Jersey public high schools during the 1975-
76 school year." The class instructors were employees of the
World Plan Executive Council - United States,40 a non-profit or-
34. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 339.
35. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
36. Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development,
Part I: The Religious Liberty Guarantees, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1425-26 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Gianella].
37. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
38. 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
39. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 198.
40. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1289.
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ganization dedicated to teaching SCI/TM throughout the coun-
try.4' None of the instructors were paid by the respective school
boards involved nor were they certified by the State Board of
Examiners. 42 The program, however, received $40,000 from the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and used school
facilities.43
Classes met four or five times a week,44 but only ten to
fifteen minutes of class time was devoted to teaching 5 the tech-
niques of transcendental meditation. 4" The rest of each class was
spent studying the nature and characteristics of the "field of
pure creative intelligence, 47 which is the central principle of the
Science of Creative Intelligence and which supplies the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of TM.48 One textbook, which described in de-
tail the qualities of creative intelligence, was used in all the
courses.49 Each student was required to attend a ceremony
called a Puja, at which the student was given his mantra.50 The
Puja was held privately, away from school property and on Sun-
days. The ceremony was conducted in front of a picture of Guru
Dev, the deceased teacher of Maharishi Mehesh Yogi, the
founder of SCIITM. Before giving the student his mantra, the
instructor sang a chant, in Sanskrit, devoted to the memory of
Guru Dev.51
Twelve plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the teaching of SCI/
TM on the grounds that it violated the establishment clauses of
41. Id. at 1287.
42. Id. at 1289.
43. See Note, T.M. and the Meaning of Religion Under the Establishment Clause,
62 MINN. L. REV. 887, 888 n.7 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Note].
44. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 198.
45. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1323.
46. Transcendental Meditation will hereinafter be referred to as TM. TM was intro-
duced into the United States in 1959 by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. It is a technique for
reducing stress and expanding conscious awareness through silent repetition of a San-
skrit word known as a "mantra." Through the meditation process, the mind allegedly
reaches the source of all thought, the so-called "field of pure creative intelligence." See
Note, Malnak v. Yogi, 10 SErON HALL L. REv. 614, nn. 1 and 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Note].
47. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1323 (D.N.J. 1977).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1305-09. See supra note 46.
51. Id.
19821
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both the federal and the New Jersey constitutions." Although
the defendants asserted that SCI/TM was not religious, Judge
Meanor of the district court enjoined further teaching of SCI/
TM in New Jersey public high schools." In a lengthy opinion, he
held that the teaching of SCI/TM was a religious activity that
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.55 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in a per curiam
opinion that relied heavily on Judge Meanor's analysis.5e
B. The District Court's Opinion
The district court addressed two issues. First, and most im-
portant for this discussion, was whether SCI/TM should be con-
sidered religious for purposes of the establishment clause, even
though its proponents asserted it was secular in nature. Second,
was whether there had been an impermissible establishment of
religion, provided that SCI/TM was found to be religious.
With respect to SCI/TM's religious character, the court said
it was "unnecessary to improvise an unprecendented definition
of religion under the First Amendment" because the case was
governed "by the teachings of prior Supreme Court decisions.57
Although admitting that SCI/TM constituted a form of religion
"unknown in prior decisional law,"5 8 the court nonetheless anal-
ogized it to beliefs or practices described as religious under
landmark establishment clause cases.59 In particular, the court
found the concept of the "field of creative intelligence," as de-
scribed in the textbook, to be analogous to the traditional con-
cept of God, 0 and the chant sung at the Puja to be analogous to
52. Id. at 1284. The New Jersey constitution states that "[t]here shall be no estab-
lishment of one religious sect in preference to another." N.J. CONST. art. I, § 4.
53. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1315 (D.N.J. 1977).
54. Id. at 1324-27.
55. Id. at 1324. The claims under the New Jersey constitution were not reached. Id.
at 1324 n.27.
56. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 198.
57. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1320.
58. Id. at 1315.
59. Id. citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1963); DeSpain v. DeKalb County Com-
munity School District, 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
60. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1314. The court relied heavily on the following
cases: Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Founding Church of Scientology v.
[Vol. 3:147
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prayer.61
The SCI/TM textbook described the "field of creative intel-
ligence" as being an infinite field of life that contains "love, jus-
tice, and truth in their pure and infinite forms;"' it was also
described as being the "ultimate reality of everything in the uni-
verse" and the "source of all power in the universe." s Contact
with this field of life through meditation is supposed to bestow
"upon individuals the ability to choose between right and wrong
spontaneously, without regard to moral codes and laws. '64 The
court found these, and other descriptions, analogous to concepts
in traditional world religions. In particular, it compared specific
descriptions of the field of creative intelligence from the text-
book with the following: 1) Buddhist concepts such as the
"Great Self" and "Nirvana"; 2) the Hindu concept of the "Su-
preme Being as Truth, Knowledge, and Bliss . . . ."; 3) the
Catholic concept of "God as Truth"; and 4) the Protestant con-
cept of God as "the very ground of our being."" The court con-
cluded that "the characteristics which are attributed to pure cre-
ative intelligence are parallel to characteristics which are
attributed to the supreme being or ultimate reality by
mankind.""
The district court also looked carefully at an English trans-
lation of the chant recited at the Puja,"7 and found it to be an
United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
61. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp at 1323. The court relied on the following cases:
DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School District, 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
62. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1320.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1321-22. In making these comparisons, the court relied heavily on the ma-
jority's opinion in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), which detailed the Chris-
tian concepts. It also relied on Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Seeger which de-
tailed the Buddhist and Hindu concepts.
66. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1323.
67. Id. at 1306-07. The chant read in part as follows:
White as camphor, kindness incarnate, the essence of creation garlanded with
Brahman, ever dwelling in the lotus of my heart, the creative impulse of cosmic
life, to That, in the form of Guru Dev I bow down.... The Unbounded, like the
endless canopy of the sky, the omnipresent in all creation, by whom the sign of
That has been revealed, to Him, to Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
1982]
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invocation of a deified human being that was a type of prayer
which had been recognized as religious in several cases.e The
court found immaterial that the chant was sung in Sanskrit and
only once for each student.e9 The chant along with other aspects
of the ceremony, such as offerings made to the picture of Guru
Dev, combined in the eyes of the court to make the Puja a
clearly religious ceremony. 0
Before the court could satisfy itself that SCI/TM was reli-
gious for first amendment purposes, however, it had to answer
the defendant's argument that determinative weight should be
given to their own subjective characterization of SCI/TM as not
being religious. The court answered this by saying that their
characterization, although relevant, could not be determinative,
because beliefs "which society recognizes as religious in nature"
were involved.71 After a lengthy discussion, the court concluded
that the subjective standard advocated by defendants was inap-
propriate where aid was involved in possible violation of the es-
tablishment clause.7' In so arguing, the court relied heavily on
Welsh 7 3 where the Supreme Court found a registrant's beliefs to
be religious, despite his avowal otherwise.7'
Once the district court determined that SCI/TM was reli-
gious, it quickly concluded that governmental support of SCI/
TM in public schools constituted an establishment of religion.
The court applied the well settled three part test described in
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.7 5 Under this test, a
government action will constitute an establishment of religion
68. Id. at 1323, citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and DeSpain v. DeKalb
County Community School District, 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
906 (1968).
69. Id. at 1323 n.25.
70. Id. at 1323.
71. Id. at 1320.
72. Id. at 1315-20.
73. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See supra notes 23-26, 33-37 and
accompanying text.
74. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1319. The defendants also argued that a nar-
rower definition of religion should be given for the establishment clause than for the free
exercise clause. In a lengthy footnote, the court upheld a unitary definition of religion for
both clauses, and pointed out that the protection, application, and function of each
clause differs. Id. at 1316 n.20.
75. 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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unless it 1) reflects a clearly secular purpose, 2) has a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and 3) avoids
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Applying
the first part of this test, the court held that even though the
government may have had a secular purpose, 6 it had chosen in-
appropriate means that propogated religious beliefs.7 Applying
the second part of the test, the court held that the promulgation
of the SCI religious concepts and practices "clearly had a pri-
mary effect of advancing religion and religious concepts. 718 And
finally, because state and federal aid helped bring the SCI/TM
courses to the public schools, the court found that there was a
clearly excessive governmental entanglement in religion.7 9 Thus,
under the three part test the court concluded that the SCI/rM
course constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion,
and granted the plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment."s
C. The Per Curiam Opinion and Judge Adams's Opinion
The court of appeals' per curiam opinion added little to
Judge Meanor's opinion, except perhaps to offer a short and
readable summary of its reasoning. Both opinions followed the
traditional approach by making comparisons to prior decisions
that described what were thought to be religious concepts and
practices analogous to those of SCI/TM. But as Judge Adams
points out, this approach ignores some of the unique facts and
legal issues of this case.81 The result reached by both courts was
based upon 1) cases which are factually and legally quite differ-
ent from the present case, and 2) an unprecedented application
of an interpretation of religion drawn from free exercise and
conscientious objector cases to an establishment clause case.as
76. The secular purposes were stated as follows: "to make available the alleged ben-
efits of TM - reduced stress, and better educability and sociability." Malnak v. Yogi, 440
F.Supp. at 1323.
77. Id. at 1324. The implication of the court's analysis seems to be that the teach-
ings of TM alone, without the overlay of SCI religious concepts and practices, might be
constitutionally permissible. Contra Note, supra note 43, at 935-46.
78. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1324.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1327.
81. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 200-01 (Adams, J., concurring).
82. Id.
19821
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Judge Adams reasoned that the district court's opinion extended
previous case law and thus required an explanation and a justifi-
cation."s In the process of giving this explanation, however,
Judge Adams supplied guidelines that move first amendment ju-
risprudence closer to a clearer definition of religion and helped
to clarify the Supreme Court's vague definition found in See-
gere4 and Welsh."5
The first section of Judge Adams's opinion reviewed ex-
isting precedent, dividing it into four categories: 1) cases dealing
with the traditional theistic definition of religion; 2) the school
prayer cases; 3) the conscientious objector cases, and 4) cases
which suggest a new definition of religion." First, because the
traditional cases stressed a belief in a Supreme Being, which is
lacking in SCI/TM, Judge Adams reasoned they were not dis-
positive.8 7 Second, the so-called school prayer cases involved ob-
viously religious activity of a traditionally theistic nature which
was voluntary in form, but not in practice.88 In contrast, the
Puja was part of an elective course that was clearly voluntary. 9
The chant was in Sanskrit and neither the students nor the in-
structors knew the meaning of the words.9 0 The defendants in-
sisted that it was a "secular Puja" with no religious meaning; the
students were apparently told this and believed it to be so.91
Thus, Judge Adams concluded that the prayer cases are factu-
ally distinguishable from the present case thereby making com-
parison difficult, and that, in any case, they do not address the
legal question of which non-theistic beliefs should be considered
religious. 2
In the final two categories of cases, which included Seeger,"8
83. Id.
84. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
85. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See supra notes 23-37 and accom-
panying text.
86. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 201 (Adams, J., concurring).
87. Id. Adams cites Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), and United States v. Mac-
Intosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
88. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 203 (Adams, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 203. But see Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. at 1323 n.25, where Judge
Meanor argues that attendance at the Puja was a mandatory part of an elective course.
90. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 203 (Adams, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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Welsh," and Torcaso,e" Judge Adams found support for a defi-
nition of religion "broader than the Theistic formulation of the
earlier Supreme Court cases."" In particular, he found the ap-
proach taken in Seeger and Welsh, which he called "definition
by analogy," helpful, but lacking clear guidelines that could be
used to avoid ad hoc adjudication. Further, Seeger and Welsh
were conscientious objector cases that did not deal with the es-
tablishment clause,e" and Torcaso, although suggesting a non-
theistic definition of religion, actually involved a traditional con-
cept of God." These cases, Judge Adams concluded, did not ad-
dress the unique legal questions presented to the court in
Malnak, and could not be relied upon without some
explanation.100
In an attempt to supply that explanation, Judge Adams for-
mulated the following three guidelines to be used in analyzing a
belief system with respect to its religious content: 1) does the
belief system deal with ultimate concerns? 2) is it comprehen-
sive in nature? 3) are there formal "signs" such as rituals, cere-
mony or a clergy, of which a court can take notice?101 These
guidelines seem to have been distilled from previous cases,"0" le-
gal commentaries,103 the views of theologians, 1"0 and a sensitivity
to the purposes and values that support the first amendment.10'
The first guideline stresses that a religious belief should ad-
dress fundamental questions about the nature of reality and
94. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
95. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
96. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 207 (Adams, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
100. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 207 (Adams J., concurring).
101. Id. at 208-09.
102. Id. at 208. In formulating his opinion, Judge Adams relied on United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), and Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
963 (1969).
103. Id. at 208 n.38, 41, 44. E.g., Gianella, supra note 36; Comment, supra note 13;
Note, supra note 43; Note, Freedom of Religion and Science in Public Schools, 87 YALE
L.J. 515 (1978).
104. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 208-09 nn. 37, 42 (Adams, J., concurring). E.g., P.
TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-2 (1958); Aquinas, Prologue to Commentary IV of Books
of Sentences, in AN AQUINAS PEADER (M. Clark ed. 1972).
105. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring).
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man's place in it. °'0 This is similar to Paul Tillich's characteriza-
tion of religion as involving an "ultimate concern."'" Religious
beliefs are those that are of the "greatest depth and utmost im-
portance" to the individual;108 they are "the sum and essence of
one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human ex-
istence . . ."09 and, as such, are the most "intensely personal"
of beliefs to the believer. °10
The second guideline is intimately related to the first, and
clarifies its scope. The beliefs in question cannot address iso-
lated "ultimate concerns." Rather, they must also form a com-
prehensive belief system that "lays claim to an ultimate and
comprehensive 'truth.' """ Science, for example, addresses iso-
lated "ultimate" questions, such as the origin of life in its theo-
ries of evolution and the origin of the universe in its Big Bang
theory,"' but unless it ties those isolated answers into a compre-
hensive belief system that creates a unified world-view, Judge
Adams would not consider it religious."' It is this stress on a
belief's comprehensiveness that truly distinguishes Judge Ad-
ams's approach from that in Seeger and Welsh, which merely
stressed that a belief involve an ultimate concern.
The third guideline Judge Adams sets forth is whether there
are "any formal, external, or surface signs that may be analo-
gized to accepted religions. ' ' 1 4 Examples of such signs are "for-
mal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of a clergy,
structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observance of
106. Id. Judge Adams also quotes the opinion of Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 906 (1969), as saying that
recognized religions are characterized by "underlying theories of man's nature or his
place in it. . ." Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring).
107. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring) (quoting P. T LCH,
DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-2 (1958)). See supra text accompanying note 28.
108. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring).
109. Id. (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 168 (1965)).
110. Id. (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965)).
111. Id. at 209.
112. "Thus the so-called 'Big Bang' theory. . . may be said to concern an 'ultimate'
question, but it is not, by itself a 'religious' idea." Id. at 208.
113. Id. For this reason, Judge Adams concluded that science courses in public high
schools do not implicate the religion clauses. For the same reason, government programs
that touch on an isolated "ultimate concern" are also not religious for first amendment
purposes. Id. at 209.
114. Id.
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holidays . .,,5 The existence of such "signs" is not determi-
native, however, in finding that a set of beliefs is religious. A
religion can exist without rituals and structure, but when such
signs do exist, they can be helpful to a court in making a deter-
mination as to religiosity. " ' These outward signs are important
because religious belief is often expressed within the social set-
ting of a group of individuals coming together to share common
experiences and ideas. And "[t]he social institutions of a reli-
gious group [can be] forceful witnesses to the solitary meaning
[or existence] of its innermost faith."117 Religion, although based
in the final analysis on deeply held personal convictions, may
have, and traditionally has had, a social side as well.
Having set forth these guidelines, Judge Adams quickly
found that their application qualified SCI/TM as a religion. Af-
ter a brief analysis of its beliefs and practices, he concluded that
SCI/TM . . . concerns itself with the same search for ultimate
truth as other religions and seeks to offer a comprehensive and
critically important answer to the questions and doubts that
haunt modern man .... When government seeks to encourage
this version of ultimate truth, and not others an establishment
clause problem arises. " s
Judge Adams then applied the three part Nyquist test,11 and,
like the district court, found a violation of the establishment
clause. 1"0
IV. Analysis: Towards a Unitary Definition of Religion
Judge Adams's guidelines describe a type of belief which
plays a unique function in an individual's life and which the first
amendment was drafted to protect from governmental interfer-
ence. The historical motivation for the adoption of the religious
guarantees in the first amendment was to free the citizenry from
115. Id.
116. Id. at 210.
117. Storm, The "Path of Law" and the Via Salutis: A Naturalistic Perspective, 26
CATH. U. L. REv. 35, 46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Storm].
118. Mahnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 214 (Adams, J., concurring).
119. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). See
supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
120. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 214-15 (Adams, J., concurring).
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the practice, transplanted from England, of having governmen-
tally sanctioned and supported churches in the American colo-
nies. 1 21 This practice resulted in the persecution of dissenters,
state imposed taxes for the support of the established faith, and
violation of the individual's freedom of choice in religious mat-
ters. 12 From these abuses grew the conviction that "individual
religious liberty could be achieved best under a government
which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise
to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of
any religious individual or group."'128
This respect for the idea of religious liberty was based on
the traditions of Protestant dissent and humanist rationalism.
These traditions
conjoined to place the individual conscience beyond the coercive
power of the secular state. For the Protestant dissenter there was
a Higher Power claiming his ultimate allegiance. For the rational
humanist the individual was anterior to the state; in the social
contract with the state he had properly reserved the right to his
opinions and beliefs on matters of ultimate concern." '
The pursuit of God or ultimate meaning and the response of the
individual to deeply held convictions or some inner spiritual res-
ervoir are internal activities made inviolable by the first amend-
ment." 5 Religious beliefs occupy too important and fundamental
a position in many individuals' lives to have the government
tampering with them."' Judge Adams's guidelines try to iden-
121. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8-16, (1947).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Gianella, supra note 36, at 1386. In his dissent in McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 562-63 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting), Justice Douglas writes, "[tihe institu-
tions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the
authority of the State; that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter;
that the individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government must
respect." Id.
125. See generally Comment, supra note 13. Quoting Dean Pound, Justice Douglas
writes that our constitutional and common law "put individual conscience and individual
judgment in the first place." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (quoting POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 42 (1921).
126. As Judge Adams recognizes, "[tihe first amendment demonstrates a specific so-
licitude for religion because religious beliefs are in many ways more important than
other ideas. New and different ways of meeting those concerns are entitled to the same
sort of treatment as the traditional forms." Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J.,
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tify those beliefs and pursuits which occupy that position and
for which the first amendment has given its special protection.1 2 7
Religious beliefs, however, are not merely one concern
among others; they form a Gestalt that "provides a basic frame-
work for perceiving, interpreting, and evaluating" 128 the world of
the believer. Because religious beliefs try to address the funda-
mental questions of existence, they tend to occupy a central po-
sition in an adherent's life and structure his entire world-view.1 29
Such comprehensiveness, which Judge Adams's second guideline
stresses heavily, increases a belief's personal nature, and puts
the belief firmly into that realm of the "inviolability of the indi-
vidual conscience"1 0 that the first amendment was designed to
protect.18 1
concurring). See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1963): "religion is too personal, too
sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." Id. (quoting
Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in THE Com-
PLETE MADISON, His BASIC WRTINGS 187 (S. Padover ed. 1973).
127. It should be pointed out that a religion often may contain certain beliefs that
do not always address ultimate concerns. On this point Judge Adams reasoned that if a
belief system is labeled "religious" because of its comprehensiveness and ultimate na-
ture, then its teachings on other related matters should be considered religious also.
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 208 n.40 (Adams, J., concurring). He referred specifically to
matters such as "diet, periods of rest, and dress" which, although not matters of ultimate
concern themselves, may be "intimately connected to such concerns." Id.
128. Storm, supra note 117, at 46.
129. "By its nature, religion . .. is an aspect of human thought and action which
profoundly relates the life of man to the world in which he lives." McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
130. Comment, supra note 13, at 1058; Gianella, supra note 36, at 1386.
131. "[Blecause religious belief provides a comprehensive and potentially pervasive
explanation of existence, its adoption or rejection by an individual is perhaps the most
personal and significant decision he can make. Thus, choices with respect to religious
belief are uniquely sensitive to governmental interference." Note, supra note 43, at 900.
These views of the fundamental and comprehensive nature of religion appear not
only to be consistent with the purposes and values underlying the first amendment, but
also with modern religious thought. For instance, Mircea Eliade has defined the heart of
the religious experience to be the appearance of "the Sacred" in life, which then provides
structure, meaning and pattern for one's life. Storm, supra note 117, at 45 (citing M.
ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE 8-18 (1959)). Erich Fromm called religion a
"frame of orientation and an object of devotion" which made sense of the world. Storm,
supra note 117, at 44-45 (quoting E. Faomm, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION 21-26
(1950)). Louis Monden described religion as the selection of a "fundamental option...
with respect to the totality of existence, its meaning and its direction." Storm, supra
note 117, at 44, (quoting L. MONDEN, SiN, Lmmr, AND THE LAw 31 (1965)). And finally,
there are the influential ideas of Paul Tillich, which have been discussed at length in the
literature. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, and Comment, supra note 13,
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Judge Adams's approach to defining religion amounts to a
broad characterization of religious belief. In the context of
Malnak v. Yogi, this approach was applied to the establishment
clause. Some scholars, as well as the defendants in Malnak, have
argued that such a broad definition should only be used for the
free exercise clause, and that a narrower one should be used for
the establishment clause. 1 2 Judge Adams, as well as the district
court, believed a unitary definition to be more appropriate.133
The arguments for a unitary definition are twofold. First,
the actual language of the first amendment seems to require a
unitary definition.3 Second, and much more important, the
purpose of the amendment demands it. Those beliefs which are
protected from government interference under the free exercise
clause, and which comprise a comprehensive belief system that
makes claims to an ultimate truth, are the very beliefs which the
establishment clause seeks to prevent the government from im-
posing on the public. "1 Such an imposition by the government
not only violates the individual's freedom of conscience and
choice, 36 but also creates a severe possibility of religiously moti-
vated civil strife,13 7 and undermines the pluralism that is
thought to be necessary for a healthy and free democratic soci-
ety.13 8 Simply, the government is prohibited from advancing or
inhibiting any specific version of ultimate truth. Therefore, if a
belief qualifies as being religious under the free exercise clause
because of its fundamental and comprehensive nature, then
surely the government is prohibited under the establishment
clause from advancing it.
The fear engendered by a unitary definition is that numer-
at 1066-67.
132. See Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F.Supp. at 1316 n.20 (D.N.J. 1977); Malnak v. Yogi,
592 F.2d 197, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1979)(Adams, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 211 (Adams, J., concurring); Judge Adams
quotes Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
135. See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 1058-60, for a discussion of the pur-
poses of the establishment and free exercise clauses.
136. Id. at 1058-59.
137. Id. at 1059. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US. 420, 430 (1961); Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 68-70 (1947) (Appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissenting
opinion); Note, supra note 43.
138. See Comment, supra note 13, at 1058.
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ous government programs will be invalidated because they might
be perceived as advancing some "ultimate concern," such as a
humanitarian ideal, that will be defined as religious."3 9 Perhaps a
strict adherence to the Seeger/Welsh approach to identifying re-
ligious belief in establishment clause cases 40 would produce this
result, but no such problem would develop if the guidelines for-
mulated by Judge Adams are applied. He writes,
[all programs or positions that entangle the government with is-
sues and problems that might be classified as "ultimate concerns"
do not, because of that, become "religious" programs or positions.
Only if the government favors a comprehensive belief system and
advances its teaching does it establish a religion. It does not do so
by endorsing isolated moral precepts or by enacting humanitarian
economic programs. 4
"Ultimate concern" is not enough; a comprehensive belief sys-
tem must also be implicated. Clearly, the advancement, or inhi-
bition, of such a belief system cannot be tolerated under the es-
tablishment clause, just as interference with such a belief system
cannot be tolerated under the free exercise clause.
It should be noted that a unitary definition of religion does
not mean a fusion of the two clauses. The two are still distinct,
with clearly different focuses. As one commentator has written,
[w]hile a focus on the actual belief of a practice's participants is
appropriate in applying a test for religion in the free exercise con-
text, in an establishment clause case the focus is on the likelihood
that the practice will promote [or inhibit] religious belief.'
Whereas the same definition of religion might be used, there
would still be different standards of application and analysis
under each clause.
V. Conclusion
In light of modern religious experience, a purely theistic
definition of religion for the purposes of the first amendment is
139. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 210-11 (Adams, J., concurring); See Comment,
supra note 13, at 1084; L. TRME, AMERICAN CONsTrrTIONAL LAw 827-28 (1978).
140. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
141. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d at 212 (Adams, J., concurring).
142. Note, supra note 43, at 922.
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no longer tenable. In several cases the Supreme Court has ap-
parently recognized this, and has offered a vague and ad hoc ap-
proach to defining certain non-traditional and non-theistic be-
liefs as religious. In the conscientious objector cases of Seeger
and Welsh, the Court formulated a definition-by-analogy ap-
proach which stresses that the adherent's belief be of a "funda-
mental" or "ultimate" nature similar to that of a belief in God
in the traditional religions.14 3
In Malnak v. Yogi,14 4 the Federal District Court for New
Jersey adopted this approach as it faced the problem of charac-
terizing the non-theistic belief system of SCI/TM as religious for
purposes of the establishment clause, although defendants
claimed that their beliefs were not religious in any way. In rea-
soning that SCIITM is religious, the district court and the third
circuit in its per curiam affirmance compared SCI/TM's beliefs
and practices to those found in previous cases that involved
traditional religious beliefs and practices or which were not es-
tablishment clause cases.
Judge Adams, in his concurring opinion in Malnak,1"5 criti-
cized the reasoning of the district court and moved beyond it by
clarifying the Supreme Court's approach with its stress on vague
analogy and "ultimate concern. '"1 4 Specifically, he expanded the
approach to include an examination of a belief system's compre-
hensiveness, as well as a review of any rituals, ceremonies, or
other external signs that might act as indicators of the compre-
hensive and fundamental nature of a belief system. This ex-
panded and flexible approach looks carefully at the function re-
ligious beliefs play in individuals' lives, and is reminiscent of
Judge Hand's definition of religion in Kauten. 7 More impor-
tantly, this stress on function brings Judge Adams's approach in
line with the purpose of the first amendment to safeguard indi-
vidual conscience from governmental involvement.
143. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
144. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), af'd per curiam, 592 F.2d
197 (3d Cir. 1979).
145. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
146. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 13; P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FArts 1-2
(1958).
147. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 17-18.
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Finally, Judge Adams's approach allows for a unitary defini-
tion of religion in both clauses by resolving the tension between
them which is created by adopting a definition of religion based
only on a belief's "ultimate" nature. By adding the requirement
that religious beliefs must involve more than just an isolated ul-
timate concern, and must, rather, implicate an entire world-
view, the fear that a unitary definition might invalidate many of
the government's humanitarian programs on establishment
grounds is quieted. Even though any given program might in-
volve an "ultimate concern," that concern is not generally part
of a unified and comprehensive belief system. If it were, then
surely it should be invalidated as a prohibited governmental ad-
vancement of religion. Under this reasoning, a unitary definition
is not only possible, but required by the first amendment's pur-
pose of keeping government from fostering one unified world-
view over another.
Steven Chananie
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